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Pushing Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise
New Issues On Appeal
INTRODUCTION
A difficult problem to which legal scholars have paid little attention over
the past several decades is where a litigant attempts to raise an issue in a
reviewing appellate court that it did not present in the trial court.1 Raising
a new issue on appeal creates problems for appellate courts. First, the
courts are constrained by their own (judicially created) general rule of
practice which states that no new issues may be raised on appeal. Second,
courts that do remove-themselves from the restraint of the general rule to
prevent injustice in an individual case are then constrained in their ability
to correctly decide the new issue. Third, the circumstances under which a
court applies the general rule are so varied that there is no set of guidelines
to determine when a new issue will be heard.2 This Note will first address
the problem of hearing a new issue on appeal by (1) examining the general
rule; (2) examining three principal exceptions3 to the general rule; and (3)
examining the Supreme Court's position, all in order to analyze whether
courts should continue to apply the general rule. Second, assuming a general
rule no longer exists, this Note will examine one proposed solution to the
problem of hearing new issues and show that while it is a method courts
could follow, the solution actually does not solve the problem. Then a
second solution will be advanced.
I. THE GENERAL RULE
A. Historical Development
The rule against considering new issues on appeal developed from the
writ of error model of appellate review as it was handed down from
1. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule,
40 VAND. L. Ray. 1023 (1987). As Professor Martineau states, this problem has been dealt
with only twice in the last fifty years or so, despite the enormous implications of the decision
whether to consider new issues on appeal. One article was written in 1932, see Campbell,
Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved
Part I, 7 Wis. L. Rxv. 91, 160 (1932), Part III, 8 Wis. L. REv. 147 (1933), and one was
written just recently, see Martineau, supra.
2. Compare these problems with the problems as stated by Professor Martineau. See
Martineau, supra note 1, at 1023.
3. Exceptions which are based on subject matter jurisdiction, which are quasi-jurisdictional,
or which are based on discovering new evidence will not be examined. For a treatment of
these see Campbell, supra note 1.
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eighteenth century English common law. The model of proceeding in error
provides that upon appeal the reviewing courtshall hear only those errors
which were presented below. In England, if the review was against a jury
for a false verdict, then the method of review involved what was called the
attaint. 4 However, questions of law were decided by the judge; therefore,
in the 1200's a proceeding very much like the attaint was developed to
reach false judgments rendered by judges. This review was a criminal
proceeding against the judge personally which evolved into the writ of
error.'
The purpose of the review was not to test whether the judgment was just,
nor did the proceeding ever involve an inquiry as to what the true judgment
ought to be; The sole question was Whether the judge committed error.
Since this review was based on determining the correctness of a judge's
actions, it was considered unfair to reverse his judgment on a point which
had never been brought to his attention. Thus, under the writ of error, the
only issues that could be presented were those that had been raised and
decided by the judge in the trial court. 6
A completely different type of review developed in equity in the English
courts of chancery. This procedure was termed an appeal, and the review
was de novo. The appellate court could review the entire case, both law
and facts, and render any type of judgment it thought justice demanded,
without regard to whether the issue upon which the appellate court based
its judgment had been presented to the lower court. The United States,
however, inherited the writ of error model from the common law and
retained the rule against considering issues in the appellate court not first
presented in the trial court.7
B. The Modern Justifications for the General Rule
Notwithstanding the fact that today there is neither a criminal action
against the judge nor the attaint against the jury, as there was six hundred
4. As one commentator explains:
This was the common-law predecessor of the new trial, but it took place before
a superior jury of twenty-four who reviewed the action of the twelve. It was
primarily a proceeding against the jury rather than against the verdict. The
attainted jury was punished by imprisonment and fined for its false verdict,
although the false verdict was at the same time, and as a useful incident, replaced
by the true verdict of the higher jury.
Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IowA L. REv. 3, 7 (1940).
5. Sunderland, supra note 4, at 7. See generally R. MARTiNEAU, MODERN APPELLATE
PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL APPEALS § 1.1 (1983); R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE
IN Civil CASES 38-71 (1941).
6. Sunderland, supra note 4, at 9. See generally R. MARTiNEAU, supra note 5, § 1.1; R.
POUND, supra note 5, at 47-60.
7. Sunderland, supra note 4, at 10; see also R, MARTiNEAU, supra note 5, § 1.1.
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years ago in England, the general rule still exists.' Thus, its defenders have
advanced modern justifications for the rule. 9
There are three modern justifications for the general rule. 0 First the rule
encourages correction and avoidance of issues in the trial court." The
rationale is that if the wronged party is encouraged (or forced) to object
and state "the grounds therefor"12 at the trial level, then the adverse party
or the trial court can decide whether to agree with the objecting party,
offer an alternative, or set out in the record the factual or legal basis for
the trial court's action against the issue raised.
If the adverse party or the trial court accepts the grounds for the party's
objection then there is no error and no grounds for a possibly costly appeal
by the objecting party; the matter is resolved in the trial court, where it
should be. If the adverse party and the trial court disagree with the objecting
party, perhaps the discussion stimulated by the objection in the court will
persuade the objecting party to agree, and he will not pursue the issue any
further. 3
Thus, if we accept the first rationale justifying the general rule, we see
how it forces a choice on the appellant as to when he can raise an issue-
a choice which causes different results procedurally. In addition, the ap-
8. Sunderland, supra note 4, at 7-8.
9. Martineau, supra note 1, at 1028.
10. This Note adopts the rationale for the general rule as adopted by Professor Martineau
from the case Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 678 F.2d 453, 456 (3d Cir.
1982), vacated and remanded, 462 U.S. 523 (1983). Pfeifer involved a question as to the
proper method of measuring damages involving future lost wages. The appellant argued that
the trial court had applied the Pennsylvania state court's formula rather than the federal
standard. Id. at 456-57. The Third Circuit held that the appellant had not properly preserved
the issue of whether the trial court had applied the state rather than the federal rule, and was
limited to arguing the proper elements of damages under the federal rule. The court stated
that in order to establish reversible error, the appellant must identify the error to the trial
court and suggest a legally appropriate course of action, as required by the general rule. Id.
at 457 n.l. Judge Ruggero Aldisert explains why the general rule is applied:
The reasons for (the general rule] go to the heart of the common law tradition
and the adversary system. It affords an opportunity for correction and avoidance
in the trial court in various ways: it gives the adversary the opportunity either
to avoid the challenged action or to present a reasoned defense of the trial court's
action; and it provides the trial court with the alternative of altering or modifying
a decision or of ordering a more fully developed record for review. This
philosophy is embodied in [Rule 46 of] the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id.; see also Martineau, supra note 1, at 1029. In order to facilitate examination of the general
rule this Note further divides the justification for the general rule into two additional rationales.
These two rationales-avoiding prejudice and facilitation of appellate review-are commonly
stated in federal appellate court opinions on the subject and follow from the statement of
Judge Aldisert concerning the rationale for correction and avoidance of issues at trial.
11. As Judge Aldisert states, the rule will encourage matters to be resolved "in the trial
court itself." Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 456.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 46.
13. See 5A J. MooRE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRcricE § 46.02, at 1904 (2d ed.
1987).
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pellant is viewed as having made the choice not to raise an issue whether
or not he actually knew he should have raised the issue. This choice is
typically classified under a "waiver" theory. 4
The general rule is next justified as being needed to prevent the adverse
party from being prejudiced by a failure of the other party to object at
trial.'5 The rationale is that if the adverse party is aware of the objection
at trial the adverse party can meet the objection or issue raised with an
alternative argument, a defense, or the introduction of new evidence in an
effort to sway the court to its position. Since the adverse party cannot
introduce new evidence in the appellate court,0 he relies on the other party's
failure to raise the issue at trial as an indication that he will not have to
introduce evidence or factual arguments on the issue at trial. To force the
adverse party to defend the issue on appeal where he could not present
factual arguments would be otherwise unfair.1 7
Finally the general rule is justified as being needed to form a complete
record at the trial level, in order for an appellate court to have a fully
developed record when reviewing an issue.' The rationale is that if a party
is encouraged to object and state his grounds at the trial level, then when
an appeal is taken at least the lower court would have dealt with the issue
in some manner, providing the appellate court with a factual record it
would not otherwise have had. 19
C. Identifying Problems with the Rule's Modern Justifications
The modern rationales offered to justify the general rule have definite
merit, It is hard to deny that it would be beneficial to encourage the
14. Many cases hold to this statement and term the failure of appellant to raise the issue
first in the trial court as a waiver of her right to raise it for the first time in the appellate
court. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 397 F.2d 162, 166 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1035 (1969) (The court held that "[flailure to make a proper and timely objection to
evidence, or to move to strike it after admission, ordinarily is a waiver of the right to object
and precludes appellate consideration.").
15. For other cases which state this rationale, see Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556
(1941) (general rule is essential so there is opportunity to present all relevant evidence and
avoid surprising appellee); Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985) (court
refused to hear new issue of step transaction doctrine because of prejudice to appellee);
Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 768 n.10 (5th Cir. 1976) (prejtqdice avoided
by binding parties to facts presented and theories argued below).
16. J. FRSEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MI.LER, Cvx PROCEDURE § 13.4, at 599 (1985).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Patrin, 575 F.2d 708, 711-13 (9th Cir. 1978) (Although the
government wanted to raise the game protection category on which it had expressly disavowed
reliance at trial, the court said appellee would be prejudiced if the issue were raised on appeal
because appellee might have tried the case differently by developing new facts in response to
or new arguments against the new issue.).
18. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
19. See City of Waco v. Bridges, 710 F.2d 220, 228 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom
Bridges v. McLennan County, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984).
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accomplishment of all matters in the trial court, the presentation of evidence
and arguments, and the formation of a complete record for the reviewing
appellate court. However, there are problems with the reasoning behind
these justifications.
The main problem with the modern justification is that the rule does not
actually encourage the raising of issues in the trial court. For the rule to
encourage the raising of issues, it must work to control conduct in the trial
court forcing trial attorneys to raise objections for fear of losing issues
entirely. However, the rule will work only if the trial attorney is aware of
the rule and can knowingly choose between raising the particular issue in
the trial court or the appellate court. Every trial attorney knows about the
general rule; however, it is questionable that a trial attorney who knew an
objection should be made or that an issue should be raised would inten-
#ionally not present the issue to the trial court. More specifically, if the
trial attorney does not present the issue, he would risk a chance of losing
his client's case or, worse, a malpractice suit against himself. However, if
the attorney does present the issue, he has a chance of furthering his client's
case and weakening his opponent's. Therefore, if aware of it, the attorney
would raise the issue, if for no other reason than he does not want to have
to take an appeal. 20
Thus, an attorney who does know of an issue will likely raise it none-
theless, without the aid of a general rule to encourage him to raise the
issue. On the other hand, an attorney who does not know of an issue at
trial cannot be encouraged by any rule to raise it. One cannot raise an issue
of which one is not aware. Thus, when the general rule could affect conduct,
it actually does not because the greater incentive to win the case is already
there to control conduct. In the other situations, where the attorney is
unaware of an issue, no rule could control conduct. However, courts
continue to use the "waiver" theory2' to justify the function of the rule as
rationally advancing the need to encourage attorneys to raise issues in the
trial court. 22 The only possible behavioral justification for the rule is if a
20. As one judge stated: "Attorneys have everything to gain and nothing to lose from
timely objection" in the trial court. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322
A.2d 114 (1974) (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting) (In Dilliplaine, the majority abolished
the "fundamental error" exception to the general rule. In discussing the merits of the exception,
Judge Pomeroy explained the incentive of raising issues without the aid of the general rule.
Id.
21. See supra note 14.
22. It should be noted that most of the confusion may result from an erroneous reliance
on the rationale of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46, as Judge Aldisert did in defining the
rationale of the general rule. Rule 46 states:
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; but for all
purposes for Which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is sufficient
that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought,
makes known to the court the action which the party desires the court to take
1989]
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trial attorney intentionally conceals an issue for appeal2 or intentionally
makes a strategy decision riot to raise the issue and subsequently tries to
raise it.
The second justification advanced in support of the general rule is that
it would be unfair to the appellee to hear an issue for the first time on
appeal. However, the general rule is not narrowly drawn to prevent unfair-
ness, making it more an excuse for the rule rather than a justification.2A
The prejudice rationale makes sense when the appellee must present new
evidence or if the appellee would have substantially altered his position had
the issue been raised at trial rather than on appeal. Such a case would be
where the appellant raises a completely new legal theory on appeal which
is not even a clear winner for the appellant.25 If the appellate court heard
the new issue, not only would there be a chance of prejudicing the appellee
(by an inability to change position and present evidence), there would be a
strong chance that the court would lack the information necessary to decide
the issue correctly.2 6
However, there are times when the prejudice rationale does not apply
because deciding the new issue does not depend on any new facts or the
or the party's objection to the action of the court and the grounds therefor; and,
if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is
made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice the party.
FaD. R. Civ. P. 46.
Rule 46 is not a codification of the general rule. There is a difference between the general
rule and the requirement of Rule 46. Rule 46 does encourage matters to be resolved in the
trial court. Rule 46 works this way: When an attorney is aware of an issue, the attorney, as
required by the rule, must object to the trial court if he wants the trial court to act on the
issue because this "(1) . . . appraises the court of the litigant's postion . . . and (2) ...
permit[s] an opponent to obviate the defect where possible." 5A J. MooRE & J. LucAs, supra
note 13, § 46.02, at 1903. It is very simple: If the attorney wants to get something corrected,
he has to let the court know about it. However, the general rule does not do this. The general
rule is a rule of what is appealable; it will not allow an appeal unless the error was objected
to in the trial court. That is all. It has no direct relationship to the trial court as the Rule 46
requirement to object, but is an after-the-fact limitation on which issues will be heard on
appeal.
23. Again, it would be difficult to think of a situation where an attorney would risk losing
a case just to chance saving an error for an appeal, but some hold this to be a possibility.
See R. MAR Au, supra note 5, § 3.2, at 35. Even if the problem of an intentional choice
not to raise an issue is present, an across the board rule, such as the general rule not to hear
any issue because it is believed every attorney in every case chooses not to raise the issue,
does not effectively deal with the problem since it appears that attorneys already have enough
incentive to raise issues (they want to win their cases). Having a rule which was narrowly
drawn to confront the problem of an intentional choice as it came up would make much more
sense than not hearing any new issue at all.
24. Sunderland, supra note 4, at 20.
25. See Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1146 (5th Cir.
1981) (appellant raised a new issue but it was "not at all certain that [appellant] would have
prevailed on this ground had it raised this issue below."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
26. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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new issue depends only on facts already in the record.27 For example, in
Sheffield Commercial Corp. v. Clemente,2 Sheffield sued Clemente for
breach of an automobile sales contract. At trial, Sheffield won and was
awarded twice the damages it should have been awarded, but Clemente
failed to point out the error. In discussingthe damages award to Sheffield,
the appellate court stated:
Aside from clashing with the clear meaning of the contractual language,
this interpretaton transforms what would otherwise be a simple require-
ment that Sheffield mitigate its damages into a clause which penalizes
Clemente . . . . In effect, it permits Sheffield . . . to sell the same
product twice and credit itself With the proceeds from both sales. 29
However, if the general rule were applied, this issue could not have been
heard because the issue was not raised in the lower court. Clemente would
have been stuck with the damage calculation, even though no new evidence
needed to be presented to decide the calculation, nor could Sheffield have
done anything at trial to change the true damage calculation-it was purely
a matter of numbers20 Here the general rule would prevent the proper
resolution of a clear case because of its inflexibility. 3 Therefore, the
rationale, if accepted, should be limited to those situations where it is truly
applicable.
The third justification advanced in support of the general rule is that it
encourages the formation of a complete record. However, since the general
rule does not effectively control conduct in the trial court (and is really
only an after-the-fact limitation on what will be heard on appeal),32 it is
questionable that the rule would also encourage the formation of a complete
record.
The only thing the rule actually ensures is that every issue which an
appellate court considers has been looked at by the trial court. Perhaps the
assurance that an issue has been passed on by the trial court does sometimes
facilitate the job of an appellate court.33 But the problem, again, is that
the general rule covers all cases, even those where error is clear from the
record, and prevents the raising of any issue on appeal that was not raised
or objected to at trial.
27. If all the facts are present, this occurrence means that no new evidence could have
been presented and appellee could not have changed his position at trial.
28. 792 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1986).
29. Id. at 285.
30. Id. at 285 n.l. (district court found net proceeds to be $8,411.34 but credited Clemente
with only $4,205.67).
31. Sunderland, supra note 4, at 9-10.
32. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., City of Waco, 710 F.2d at 228 (The "facilitation accorded appellate review
by a lower court's consideration of the legal issues and judicial resolution of factual disputes
commands that [the general rule] not be disregarded lightly.").
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
In summary, we see first that the general rule is said to encourage the
resolution of all matters in the trial court.34 The rule in fact limits the issues
which are heard to those which were first raised at trial, making the rule
an after-the-fact limitation on what an appellate court can review s.3 Thus,
despite what conduct it might encourage at trial, the rule sharply limits the
number of appeals, expressing a sincere concern for judicial economy. 6
Second, the general rule is said to ensure fairness to the appellee by
encouraging all evidence and arguments to be raised in the trial court.
Again, it is questionable whether the rule is always needed to ensure that
the appellee is not prejudiced. However, it is clear that the rule in fact
ensures in all cases that the appellee first had the opportunity to present
her evidence and arguments, whether the appellee wanted to, needed to, or
was able to present evidence to rebut the issue.
Third, the general rule is said to encourage the development of a complete
record for the reviewing appellate court. As stated before, the rule may or
may not encourage conduct in the trial court. But the rule in fact ensures
that every issue which comes before a reviewing appellate court has first
been passed upon by the trial court.
There is a dichotomy between what the rule is said to do and what it in
fact accomplishes. The federal appellate courts have responded to the tension
between the rule's effect and its justifications by forming exceptions to the
general rule. Examining these exceptions will help in understanding the
competing concerns which are at work when a court decides to hear an
issue for the first time on appeal and will help in deciding if there is any
effective method of dealing with the problem of hearing new issues on
appeal while still holding to the favorable aspects of the modern rationales
such as preventing prejudice to the opposing party.
II. How FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS HAVE RESPONDED TO TH
GENERAL RULE
Federal appellate courts still adhere to the general rule of not hearing
issues raised for the first time on appeal.17 But these courts have forgone
34. When comparing what the rule is said to accomplish with what the rule in fact
accomplishes, the author does not imply that the rule may not actually accomplish what it is
said to do. However, the author wishes to show that those accomplishments under the "in
fact" category are supported by actual results while those under the "said to" category are
only aspirations of the justifications for the rule and are not supported by any concrete results.
35. See supra note 22.
36. See, e.g., City of Waco, 710 F.2d at 227 (one reason for "justifying such rule is
founded in the need to promote judicial economy"); Coastal States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d
1358, 1364 (5th Cir. 1983) (judicial economy is served); Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs. v. La
Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 990 (lth Cir. 1982) (the general rule "derives primarily
from the needs of judicial economy"); Payne, 654 F.2d at 1146 (judicial economy served).
37. See, e.g., Ryan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 715 F.2d 644, 650 (D.C.
[Vol. 64:985
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
applying the rule under certain circumstances, so that "like almost every
other principle of law, the [general rule] which adjures courts not to reverse
on grounds . . .not pressed below does have its exceptions." 38 The excep-
tions developed by the courts are both broad 39 and narrow in scope. 4°
However, no matter how courts articulate their doctrine, they hear new
issues despite the existence of a general rule not to hear them.4'
In order to understand why there are exceptions, one must understand
why appellate courts would want to hear an issue even though it was not
preserved in the trial court. Also, one must understand the difficulties
involved in hearing an issue for the first time in an appellate court.
A. Why Appellate Courts Respond
First, appellate courts hear new issues because they want disputes resolved
correctly. An error committed in a lower court persists whether or not the
error is timely brought to the attention of that court. While failure to
preserve an issue prevents its consideration on appeal, such failure does not
cure the error. Therefore, as long as the error is not corrected, the decision
below is wrong. Since an appellate court's job is to correct error on every
issue which is preserved, they sometimes do not see their job as ending just
because an error was not timely raised. 42
An early case to recognize this concern was Hormel v. Helvering.43 In
deciding whether the appellate court below had the power to pass upon any
Cir. 1983) (failure of appellant to raise issue of individual versus class taxpayer status in
Freedom of Information Act proceeding warranted nonconsideration by court); Evans v. Valley
W. Shopping Center, 567 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (no reason to consider
issues not raised below); Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 532 F.2d 1118, 1119 (7th
Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (even meritorious claims cannot be urged on appeal when not presented
below).
38. National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 825 (7th Cir. 1986).
39. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 361 (11th Cir. 1984) (appellate
court will hear a new issue on appeal where an "interest of substantial justice is at stake").
40. Matter of Novack, 639 F.2d 1274, 1277 (5th Cir. 1981) (appellate court will hear issue
if there was no opportunity to object).
41. See infra Part IIC.
42. See Sunderland, supra note 4, at 10. In addition to this notion, in the federal system
there is a statute which authorizes appellate courts to render any judgment "as may be just
under the circumstances." See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1982) ("The Supreme Court or any other
court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment,
decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review . . .as may be just under
the circumstances.").
43. 312 U.S. 552 (1941). The major issue in Hormel was whether the appellee should have
included a certain trust income in his individual tax return according to two sections of the
tax code. The Board of Tax Appeals decided against the tax commissioner, holding the income
was not taxable under either section. However, in the circuit court of appeals the commissioner
abandoned reliance on the previous two sections and raised a third as a basis for taxing. Id.
at 554-555. The court of appeals heard the issue raised under this new section and held that
the income was taxable.
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questions other than those which were squarely presented in the proceedings
before the trial court, 44 Justice Black relied on a statute which gave the
appellate court power to modify, reverse or remand a case "as justice may
require. ' 4 Justice Black succinctly stated the appellate court's choice of
foregoing the judicially created general rule in order to prevent an erroneous
outcome in an individual case:
Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends ofjustice, not to defeat them. A rigid and undeviating judicially declared
practice under which courts of review would invariably and under all
circumstances decline to consider all questions which had not previously
been specifically urged would be out of harmony with this policy. Orderly
rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules of fundamental
justice."
The general rule gives way to doing "justice" when it prevents an appellate
court from resolving a dispute correctly. However, Justice Black also stated
that the general rule should only be foregone under "certain circum-
stances." 47
B. The Competence Problem
If appellate courts are sometimes faced with a lower decision where
obvious "injustice" has occured, but the appellant failed to preserve the
error, fairness dictates that the courts should hear the new issue. Appellate
courts are unable to do SO, 4 8 however, because they are restrained by their
limited decision making capability. An appellate court cannot hold a full
trial on an issue, take new evidence, or hear arguments on every point
related to the new issue which may be in the record; rather, it is limited to
the factual record created by the trial court. 49 Thus, an appellate court
many times will not gain anything from hearing an issue, since it would
not have the information necessary to decide the issue correctly. 0
44. Here, the Board of Tax Appeals was the lower court. Id. at 555.
45. Id. at 556-57 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1141(c)(1) (Supp. 1939)).
46. Id. at 557.
47. Id.
48. It must be noted again, if it is not already clear, that the general rule is not authorized
by any statutory or jurisdictional limitation, but is a judicially-created rule. See Franki
Foundation Co. v. Alger-Rau & Assocs., 513 F.2d 581, 586 (3d Cir. 1975) (the general "rule
is only a rule of practice and may be relaxed whenever ...justice so warrants").
49. J. FRiEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MLER, supra note 16, § 13.4, at 599.
50. See, e.g., Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985) (court declined
to hear new issue because "[a]pplication of the step transaction doctrine requires a detailed
factual inquiry ... and there may be facts relevant to the issue which were not developed in
the record"); New Jersey Dep't of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 724 F.2d 34, 36 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983)
(court will hear new issue because it is "within the competence of appellate courts and is not
predicated on complex factual determinations"); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail
Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (court would not hear new issue because "further
factual development would be essential for a proper resolution of this issue), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1000 (1982).
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The most obvious method to cure the capability problem is to have an
appellate court perform the functions of a trial court. If the appellate court
is allowed to make factual determinations and take additional evidence,
then there is no worry that the court would be incapable of deciding an
issue, because, presumably, the appellate court would then be able to obtain
the information necessary to decide the issue correctly. Some state jurisdic-
tions have used this method,"' but it is unlikely that such an idea could
take over the strong hold that the error model has on appellate practice
today.52
Another solution allows appellate courts to remand new issues for further
proceedings. The trial court could thus retry the issue which was missed,
manufacturing a complete record for the reviewing appellate court.53
A final method for curing the capability problem is to not hear the new
issue at all, because if the court does not, there is no worry of deciding
the issue incorrectly. However, not hearing the issue is just applying the
general rule which the court is already trying to sidestep, running contrary
to the fact that the court wants to hear the issue. This final observation
points out that the general rule does address the competence problem, albeit
an extreme solution in the face of a court that wants to hear a new issue. 54
Besides these extreme remedies, there must be some point in between
where an appellate court can find that certain circumstances are present
which will ensure that it is capable of informatively deciding a new issue,
despite a failure to raise the issue in the trial court. The federal appellate
courts have found this middle ground when they formed exceptions to the
general rule.55
51. One such state is California. A special statute provides that in cases in which trial by
jury is not a matter of right or is waived, the appellate courts may make factual determinations
contrary to or in addition to those made by the trial judge and may take additional evidence
in order to do so. CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 909 (1989). It has been suggested that "[pirobably
the most significant practical characteristic of this California exception is its sparing use,
especially in situations where the additional evidence aims at reversal of the judgment instead
of affirmance." Louisell & Degnan, Rehearing in American Appellate Courts, 44 CAL. L.
Rnv. 627, 629 n.8 (1956).
52. However some commentators have wished it were otherwise. See R. PoUND, supra note
5, at 107-10; Sunderland, supra note 4, at 10. More compelling reasons for not adopting the
California model include efficient division of functions and allocation of limited judicial
resources.
53. Wisconsin is one state which authorizes this by statute. The statute authorizes the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to grant a new trial whenever there has been a miscarriage of justice
(even if it is beyond the record). Wis. STAT. § 751.06 (1979-80).
54. Thus, we will see that the exceptions will be addressing some of the same competence
concerns that the general rule actually solves as well. Of course we have already seen that the
general rule in fact addresses some concerns other than competence, such as judicial economy
completely unrelated to competence. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 66-67, 77 and accompanying text.
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C. A Critical Examination of the Federal Appellate Court
Exceptions
1. Pure Question of Law
One of the most common exceptions to the general rule appellate courts
use is the characterization of a new issue on appeal as one that is purely
legal in nature. The federal appellate courts characterize many issues as
purely legal, including questions of the applicability of a constitutional
provisionS6 statutes, 7 or legal doctrines which were not raised in the trial
court.5 8 The pure law exception addresses the basic concern of an appellate
court's capability to decide new issues informatively.
Recall the problem of hearing new issues on appeal because of the lack
of factual information. The pure law exception attempts to solve the problem
by allowing only "legal" issues to be heard. The rationale is that a legal
question does not depend on the factual record below, or that the pertinent
record is fully developed and easily applied to the legal theory. 59 It is further
assumed that the party against whom the issue is raised would not have
tried her case differently either by developing new evidence and facts in
56. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535-37 (1962) (failure to question
absence of article III judge does not forgo issue); Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance, 635
F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (facial challenge to constitutionality df Federal Corrupt
Practices Act could be raised for first time on appeal when facts fully developed), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 917 (1981); McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596, 601 (7th Cir.) (failure of state's
counsel to raise eleventh amendment immunity below does not waive issue), cert. denied, 434
U.S, 966 (1977), cert. granted and judgment vacated, No. 87-1384 (Jan. 23, 1989) (1989 W.L.
4558).
57. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Electiofis, 39 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1969) (in interest ofjudicial economy, applicability of Voting Rights Act provision not precluded from consideration
by failure to raise issue below where all facts undisputed); Telco Leasing v. Transwestern Title
Co., 630 F.2d 691, 693-94 (9th Cir. 1980) (where issue purely one of law and not affected by
factual record below appellate court has discretion to consider for first time applicatlion of
correct state statute concerning attorney's fees); Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d
762, 768 n.10 (5th Cir. 1976) (new argument based on state wrongful death statute considered
on appeal where purely legal question raised and post-oral argument briefs submitted); Smith
v. Pasqualetto, 246 F.2d 765, 767-78 (Ist Cir. 1957) (where relevant "Sunday statute"
overlooked below, consideration on appeal imposed no substantial injustice upon parties if
costs of appeal imposed on appellant).
58. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976) (purely legal issue of federal
abstention may be raised for first time on appeal); National Advertising Co. v. City of Rolling
Meadows, 789 F.2d 571, 574-75 (7th Cir. 1986) (case disposed of on new legal issue to avoid
deciding constitutional issue); Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. City of N. Kan. City, 276 F.2d 932,
939 (8th Cir. 1960) (public policy underlying abstention doctrine merits appellate consideration
despite failure to raise issue below). See Martineau, supra note 1, at 1035-36.
59. See, e.g., Bolker, 760 F.2d at 1042; United States v. Patrin, 573 F.2d 708, 712 (9th
Cir. 1978).
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response to or advancing legal arguments against the issue. 60 Thus, a failure
to raise the issue below does not limit the court's ability to decide the issue
because it would not have affected the decisionmaking ability of the court.
The reasoning behind the exception has its appeal. First, it makes sense.
If an appellate court has an issue before it which is not tied to the appellate
court's inherent limitation as a non-trial court, it should decide the new
issue because it is likely to decide correctly.61 Second, as far as exceptions
go, this exception attempts to mitigate some of the concerns of the general
rule which it sidesteps. Two of the concerns of the general rule are that the
factual record for review would be incomplete and the adverse party would
be prejudiced if a new issue was heard on appeal.62 This exception eliminates
these concerns by requiring a complete factual record or that the issue not
be tied to the record at all, and inquires into the possible prejudice to the
appellee. 61
However, the pure law exception has been criticized because of the
practical implications of applying the exception. First, when a completely
new legal theory is raised for the first time on appeal it would seem to be
a rare occasion where the issue does not require any facts, or that the case
was tried so completely that an appellate court can say that no relevant,
additional evidence is necessary to decide the issue.6 Second, it is question-
able to assume that the party against whom the issue is raised would not
have altered his position by introducing new evidence or arguments had a
new determinative issue been raised in the trial court.65 But these criticisms
can be avoided, because there are courts which actually look into the
concern of factual development and avoiding prejudice to the appellee
before characterizing a new issue as one that is a pure question of law.
These courts refuse to hear a new issue unless the above concerns are
adequately met. 6
60. Patrin, 575 F.2d at 712 (evident principle underlying pure law exception is prejudice,
meaning "if [appellee] might have tried his case differently either by developing new facts in
response to or advancing distinct legal arguments against the issue, it" should not fdll under
the exception).
61. See supra notes 48-50 and acclompanying text.
62. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
63. But note that the exception does not address the other concerns of the general hule
such as encouraging issues to be raised at trial and furthering judicial economy. See supra
notes 11-36 and accompanying text.
64. Martineau, supra note 1, at 1038.
65. Id. at 1040.
66. For example, in Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, appellant wanted to
raise for the first time on appeal the defense that the activity of appellee was not protected
as opposition to unlawful employment practices. The court stated it would hear the new issue
if it was "a pure question of law . . . and refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage
of justice." 654 F.2d at 1144 (quoting Martinez v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir.
1976)).
The court stated that characterizing an issue as a pure question of law would require, first,
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In addition, courts have looked to circumstances which help ensure that
the problems of factual development and prejudice to the appellee are
addressed. One example of such circumstances include hearing a new issue
only because it was closely tied to an issue previously raised in the trial
court, which helps ensure that the appellee is not surprised by a completely
new issue on appeal, and that many of the facts necessary to decide the
issue are already in the record.67 Another case considered the fact that the
new issue was raised on an appeal from a summary judgment, ensuring
that there would be no concern of prejudice because a reversal on the new
issue would provide both parties an opportunity to present arguments and
evidence by holding a full trial.6"
Although the pure question of law exception is not always applied properly
by the federal appellate courts, the exception can be instructive in two ways.
First, the exception shows that if applied properly there are some circum-
stances under which a new issue can be safely heard on appeal because the
appellate court can still informatively decide the new issue; proper appli-
cation solves the capability problem while allowing the appellate court to
correct an erroneous trial decision.
However, more importantly, the exception shows that appellate courts
hear new issues despite a failure to address all of the general rule's concerns.
That is, use of the exception does not encourage resolving issues in the trial
court6 l9 because hearing an issue on appeal simply does not allow parties to
take alternative action or no action to avoid an issue in the trial court. The
that no further factual development be necessary and, second, that appellee would not have
presented different arguments or new evidence had the issue been raised first at trial. The
court found that the new issue here would require the court to engage in a difficult balancing
of the interests of the employer and employee. Id. at 1145. Here, appellant's failure to raise
the defense at trial precluded appellee from presenting any evidence necessary to rebut
appellant's defense. The court stated that "further factual development would be essential for
a proper resolution of [the] issue." Id. at 1146. (emphasis added). Therefore, since the fact-
finder "must have an opportunity to hear evidence, to balance the competing considerations,
and to reach a conclusion as to the reasonableness of [appellee's] conduct," the court would
not characterize the issue as one that is purely legal. Id. at 1145.
67. See, e.g., National Metalcrafters, 784 F.2d at 826 (court considered that the issue
raised was "logically as well as factually intertwined with the issue that [appellants] did raise
of preemption by the National Labor Relations Act").
68. See, e.g., Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 990
(5th Cir. 1982). Of course, another sure method which courts have used to eliminate the
concerns of factual development and avoidance of prejudice to the appellee is to remand each
case to allow the appellee an opportunity to present evidence it thought necessary to support
the position. See, e.g., Ahmed v. American S.S. Mut. Protection & Indem. Ass'n, 640 F.2d
993, 996 (9th Cir. 1981) (remand limited to consideration of equal protection arguments was
appropriate), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983); Patrin, 575 F.2d at 712 (dictum) (in light of
recent change in the law remand for further findings of fact may be required to develop
arguments); Nuelson v. Sorensen, 293 F.2d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1961) (case remanded because
unargued and undecided question of breach of contract might require further fact finding).
69. For a discussion of encouraging the raising of issues, see supra notes 11-13 and
accompanying text.
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exception does not further the need to facilitate appellate review by hearing
only issues which the trial court has passed on,70 because it is doing the
exact opposite and allowing an issue not considered to be heard. Also, the
exception does not advance the goal of judicial economy7' because the
exception is continuing the litigation, not ending it. Thus, although termed
an "exception" to the general rule, it actually is not because the exception
only partially addresses the commonly accepted rationales for the general
rule.
2. Plain Error, Fundamental Error, or "Beyond Any Doubt"
Exception
A second principal exception to the general rule is seen when an appellate
court characterizes an issue which was not raised in the trial court as
something which is plain error, basic or fundamental error, or where the
resolution of error would be "beyond any doubt. ' 72 First, to understand
this exception it is necessary to distinguish it from the pure law exception
which deals with the raising of whole new legal theories on appeal (such as
raising a statute or a constitutional provision). 73 By contrast, this second
exception deals with the identification of an error in the trial below not
previously objected to, such as where appellant failed to object to an
incorrect damage calculation, 74 improper closing arguments, 75 or improper
use of evidence. 76
The exception otherwise rests on the same competence rationale as the
pure law exception. The reasoning is that error is so clear from the trial
record that despite a failure to point out the error at trial (to put an
objection on record) there could be no question as to the proper resolution
of the matter. Since there could be no question about the outcome, an
appellate court would be capable to decide the issue correctly. 77
This rationale is embodied in the Federal Rule of Evidence 103 formu-
lation of the plain error principle. 78 In Rule 103, part (a) defines reversible
70. For a discussion of facilitation, see supra notes 18-19 & 33 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of judicial economy, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
72. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 741 F.2d at 361.
73. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
74. Sheffield Commercial Corp. v. Clemente, 792 F.2d 282, 285-86 (2d Cir. 1986).
75. See Rojas v. Richardson, 703 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 713 F.2d
226 (5th Cir. 1983).
76. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 103(a), (d).
77. See, e.g., Sheffield Commercial Corp., 792 F.2d at 286 (because error appeared "on
the face of the documents," court will take cognizance of it though no timely objection was
made).
78. FED. R. Evm. 103. "Rule 103 makes the plain error principle fully applicable to civil
cases, where previously neither rule nor statute expressly accomplished this result." 1 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EViDENCE § 22, at 129 (1977) [hereinafter LOuSsELL &
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error79 and part (d) defines plain error.8 0 Both definitions have the same
standard requiring that the error must affect a "substantial right" of the
party.-' If the term "substantial right" is given the same meaning in each
rule, then a failure to object at trial would be inconsequential except for
the added requirement that Rule 103(d) error be plain from the record. 2
Thus, to fall under the plain error exception of Rule 103, all one must do
is determine whether the error is clear from the trial record, requiring no
additional factual development. 3
But, generally, civil cases endorsing the application of the plain error
principle hold that its purpose is to avoid a "miscarriage of justice" or to
correct "injustice,' '84 creating the impression that only grave error may be
redressed under the plain error doctrine.85 There is a notion that plain error
must be more serious than reversible error, lest the prompt action by the
litigant at trial be undermined. Yet it is doubtful that lawyers or judges
can either define or consistently recognize an added increment of seriousness
showing error to be not only reversible but "plain." There is also room to
doubt that the phrases "miscarriage of justice" and "injustice" refer to
the same conditions, and to wonder whether anything really is gained by
allowing reversal under the plain error principle only where the system has
completely failed.8 6
It is this confusion between the "plainness" of an error and its gravity
which breeds much of the criticism of the plain error principle. Because of
a lack of a consistent definition 7 which clearly separates the two concepts,88
MUELLER]. Also note that 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970) authorizes appellate courts to "affirm,
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment ... or require such further proceedings to
be had as may be just under the circumstances." An occasional pre-Federal Rules of Evidence
civil case has relied upon this section in noticing errors not raised at trial. LOUISELL & MUELLER,
supra, at 129 n.10. For an example of such a civil case, see Nuelson v. Sorenson, 293 F.2d
454, 462 (9th Cir. 1961).
79. FED. R. Evm. 103(a).
80. FED. R. Evm. 103(d).
81. FED. R. EViD. 103(a), (d).
82. FED. R. Evm. 103(d).
83. Note that this is similar to the inquiry under the pure law exception. See supra note
59 and accompanying text.
84. LOUSsELL & MUELLER, supra note 78, § 22, at 132. See, e.g., Atlantic C.L.R.R. v.
Kammerer, 205 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 1953) ("[Tlhis court may notice a plain error of its
own motion if justice requires it.").
85. LousELL & MUELLER, supra note 78, § 22, at 132-33. There are cases, however, which
do not do this. See, e.g., Sheffield Commercial Corp., 792 F.2d at 286.
86. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 78, § 22.
87. 3A C. Wuoi-rr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 856, at 337 (2d ed. 1982)
("Indeed the cases give the distinct impression that 'plain error' is a concept appellate courts
find impossible to define, save that they know it when they see it.").
88. For example, most courts use alternatively the terms "plain" error and "fundamental"
error to stand for the same principle. Compare Watchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons, 405 F.2d
1061, 1063 (4th Cir. 1969) (court will hear issue because "fundamental rights" involved) with
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the exception is seen as basically ad hoc in nature without any neutral
standards to apply. s9 This criticism, however, is valid not because of a flaw
inherent in the plain error doctrine, but because of the confusion of the
concepts of "plainess" and "gravity" and their misapplication by courts.
Federal Rule of Evidence 103 not only provides express statutory authority
for use of the plain error principle, but also clearly omits any language
making gravity a requirement for operation of the principle by defining
reversible and plain error standards to be synonymous. 9° If this Rule and
its interpretation were used as a guideline for the plain error principle, then
there would be much less reason to criticize the exception.
Because the plain error exception rests on the same competence rationale
as the pure law exception, it, like the pure law exception, addresses only
the one competence concern of the general rule and fails to address the
other concerns. 91 Thus, the plain error exception is also not a true exception
to the general rule.
3. Public Interest Exception
The third principal exception examined is seen when an appellate court
hears a new issue because it is of "public interest." 92 Simply stated, if an
appellate court considers the new issue raised to be of importance to the
public, the new issue will be heard despite the general rule. The principle
of the exception is probably based in the dual role of the appellate courts
Sheffield Commercial Corp., 792 F.2d at 286 (court will hear issue because it is "plain"). If
a court calls an error plain, it connotes a concept of obviousness, and nothing more. However,
if a court calls an error fundamental, it may connote not only obviousness, but also gravity.
While it may be an esoteric argument to distinguish the two words, it is far more important
to realize how the concepts are different and how, depending on whether a court is searching
for clear error as opposed to severe error, it affects the use of the principle as an exception
to the general rule.
89. See Martineau, supra note 1, at 1052.
90. Also note that the advisory committee's note to Rule 103 supports the conclusion that
gravity is not part of the "plain error" inquiry. The note states:
In the nature of things the application of the plain error rule will be more likely
with respect to the admission of evidence than to exclusion, since failure to
comply with normal requirements of offers of proof is likely to produce a record
which simply does not disclose the error.
FED. R. EviD. 103 advisory committee's note, subdivision e (emphasis added). If gravity were
a factor, the advisory committee would find no distinction between the two above situations.
An exclusion of evidence could be so "fundamental" as to result in a "miscarriage of justice,"
despite the lack of a record on the error, that the gravity factor would allow the error to be
heard under the plain error rule. But the advisory committee note expresses the need for a
record of the error, not an inquiry into its gravity. (Of course it is clear that error which
would be considered as "harmless" would not qualify for plain error treatment.).
91. Recall these concerns: encouraging resolution of matters in the trial court; ensuring
facilitation of appellate review, and advancing judicial economy. See supra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
92. See cases cited infra note 94.
19891
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in deciding individual cases and of determining principles of law applicable
to future cases. The danger of establishing a misleading precedent and the
desire to correct an erroneous interpretation of an important principle of
law sometimes become decisive factors in the consideration of a new issue
on review. 93 This exception by its nature has no guidelines for its application
because it is so broadly defined. However, a review of the case law reveals
that the exception typically involves the first judicial review of a statute or
a constitutional provision which the court sees as having an impact on the
public or on future litigants. 94
The public interest exception, unlike the pure law and plain error excep-
tions, is not based on the rationale that the appellate court in these cases
is capable of correctly deciding a new issue because of a sufficiently complete
factual record. The public interest exception is blind to this concern because
the appellate court will typically decide a new issue without explicitly
considering the development of the factual record or whether the appellee
may have presented new evidence to confront the issue were it raised in the
trial court. 95 Presumably, if the record was deficient enough to prevent a
proper decision, the reviewing court would remand the case for further
development of the facts and arguments; however, the exception is silent
on this point.96
Compare the treatment of new issues under the public interest exception
to, for example, the treatment of new issues under the pure law exception.
The pure law exception allows a whole new constitutional provision or
93. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 100.
94. See, e.g., Sheffield Commercial Corp., 792 F.2d at 286 (court will consider Motor
Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act "because of the strong public interest in enforcement of
the Act"); National Metalcrafters, 784 F.2d at 825 (court will hear § 301 argument because it
is "based on strongly held policies demarcating the spheres of competence of state and federal
government"); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 741 F.2d at 361 (court will hear argument based
on Cuban Assets Control Regulations because failure to decide issue would leave "a vacuum
... with respect to whether a license is required to invoke federal court jurisdiction under
facts such as [present] here"); New Jersey Dep't of Educ., 724 F.2d at 36 n.1 (despite failure
to raise issue below, court will hear new argument based on Elementary and Secondary
Education Act because it is "an issue of national importance"); Krause v. Sacramento Inn,
479 F.2d 988, 989 (9th Cir. 1973) (despite failure to raise below, court will hear equal protection
argument because relaxation of the general rule is required "in appeals wherein there are
significant questions of general impact").
95. None of the cases expressly considers these factors. See supra note 94.
96. For example, one appellate case held that an issue should be heard despite the general
rule but stated that:
Rather than consider the matter . . . the appellate court may note the existence
of the unargued, undecided question and remand the case to the lower court
In our opinion justice requires that such a course be followed in this case. The
cause is remanded with directions to afford the parties an opportunity . . . to
present any or all of the additional theories . . . and all appropriate defenses
thereto.
Nuelsen, 393 F.2d at 462.
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statute to be heard on review, 91 just as the public interest exception allows.
But rather than ignoring factual development and possible prejudice to the
appellee, the pure law exception accounts for these two concerns. The public
interest exception, however, does not look at these concerns; at least it does
not do so outwardly.9
The public interest exception blatantly violates the rationale of the general
rule because it does not account for any of the concerns that the general
rule is said to protect. 99 Its use is a matter of policy outweighing the rule,
providing a clear example of how the general rule is not a "general" rule
at all. The federal appellate courts have weakened the general rule by
forming and applying exceptions which do not account for the rationales
supporting the rule.
III. SuPREME COURT PRECEDENT: THE GENERAL RULE Is NOT A
GENERAL RULE
The modern justifications for the general rule are questionable because
the rule does not further them adequately, if at all.1°° The exceptions to the
rule developed by the federal appellate courts put into question whether the
rule is of general application or rather a rule courts apply under "certain
circumstances" of each case. 10 As further evidence of erosion of the rule's
existence, the Supreme Court has stated that hearing new issues on appeal
should not necessarily be determined by the application of a general rule.' °2
The Court took this position in the case of Singleton v. Wulff03 where
it stated that the rule of when to hear a new issue on appeal is a matter
of "discretion" on the part of each appellate court. 104 In reaching this
97. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
98. Presumably if an issue raised for the first time on appeal did not meet the pure law
exception, if the issue was of strong public interest, it could still be heard under the public
interest exception.
99. This exception, like the pure law and plain error exceptions, does not encourage the
accomplishment of matters in the trial court; if an issue is not heard until the appeal, the
parties cannot magically go back and present arguments in the trial court. Nor does the
exception promote judicial economy. Not hearing an issue promotes judicial economy; hearing
one simply does not.
100. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
102. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
103. Id. Singleton involved two physicians' challenge to a Missouri statute denying Medicaid
benefits for abortions that were not "medically indicated." The district court dismissed the
complaint for lack of standing. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the physicians did
have standing. The court of appeals proceeded to the merits of the case because the statute
"could not profit from further refinement," and was "obviously unconstitutional." Id. at
111-12. Because the statute constituted a special regulation on abortion that discriminated
against patients and physicians on the basis of the patient's poverty, the appeals court held
that the statute violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 112.
104. Id. at 121 (dictum).
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result, Justice Blackmun first stated the general rule and gave the commonly
accepted justification. 05 He then stated what power appellate courts have
when a new issue is before them:
The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the
first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts
of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. We announce
no general rule. Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal
appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below.' c
The Court continued and gave its only guidance which appellate courts
could use in their exercise of this newly found discretion."' 7 This guidance
is limited to the situations where a new issue's resolution is beyond any
doubt or where "injustice might otherwise result."' 0 8
The Court's language has been followed in some of the federal circuits.
When confronted with a new issue on appeal, these appellate courts explain
that the general rule is merely a rule of practice created by the courts
themselves and the decision to hear an issue is up to the court's own
discretion. 9 However, although these courts uniformly recognize their dis-
cretionary authority to hear new issues on appeal, there is no uniform
method by which the appellate courts exercise this discretion. That is,
between circuits there is no discernable set of guidelines for deciding when
a new issue should be heard." 0 Even within circuits there is no consistency."'
105. He states that the rule is "essential in order that parties may have the opportunity to
offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues [and] in order that litigants may not
be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity
to introduce evidence." Id. at 120 (quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941)).
106. Id. at 121 (dictum).
107. Id.
108. Id. However, "[t]hese examples [were] not intended to be exclusive." Id. at 121 n.8.
109. See, e.g., National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 825 (7th Cir. 1986) (court
cites Singleton and states it will hear issue under "exceptional circumstances"); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 360 (lth Cir. 1984) (whether court will hear new
argument under statute is "left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals"); New
Jersey Dep't of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 724 F.2d 34, 36 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983) (the general rule is a
"rule of discretion, rather than jurisdiction" and court will hear new issue under "special
fircumstances"); Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 989
(11th Cir. 1982) (decision of whether to consider an argument first made on appeal is "left
...to the discretion of the courts of appeals"); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail
Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (decision to hear argument under new statute is
left to the court's "discretion"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
110. For example, the Eleventh Circuit stated that there are "certain exceptional circum-
stances in which it may be appropriate to exercise this discretion." Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 741 F.2d at 360. The appellate court then found these circumstances to be present when
the facts of the case fall under one of the preexisting exceptions to the general rule. The court
listed these categories as: (1) when an issue is a pure question of law, (2) where appellant had
no opportunity to object, (3) "where [an] interest of substantial justice is at stake," (4) where
proper resolution is "beyond any doubt," and (5) where an issue is of general impact or of
great public concern. Id. at 360-61.
The Seventh Circuit has used a more flexible approach. In one case, after citing Singleton,
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The Supreme Court essentially had found this area of the law a mess and
left it a mess. An appellant who wishes to raise a new issue can find his
only guidance in the words of the Court itself: "We announce no general
rule."11
Thus, according to the Supreme Court, we can conclude that the problems
which were raised earlier-i.e., capability to decide a new issue informa-
tively, concerns of judicial economy, and the encouragment of accomplishing
matters in the trial court-are not necessarily solved by the general rule.
Their resolution is left up to an individual appellate court's discretion.
However, we may also conclude that while the Court has decided that
solving these problems is best left to an individual court's discretion rather
than a general rule," 3 the Court has left another problem in its solution's
wake-if the process is purely discretionary, one cannot clearly predict
when, or even what, new issues may be heard on appeal.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. One Proposed Solution: A Criticism
The problem of hearing new issues on appeal is not new to appellate
procedure.11 4 But recently one commentator, Professor Martineau, addressed
the problem and proposed his own solution. He states that in order "[t]o
restore predictability to this crucial area of judicial process, appellate courts
should consider only those new issues that are reflected in the record and
would provide a basis for relief pursuant to a rule similar to Federal Rule
the court used the same "exceptional circumstances" language as the Eleventh Circuit. National
Metalcrafters, 784 F.2d at 825. But rather than limiting the circumstances to determining if a
case falls within one of the preexisting categories, the court looked to a number of factors
which make the new issue one an appellate court should hear. First, hearing the new issue
would further a strongly held public policy in favor of applying uniform federal principles in
each case. Id. at 825-26. Second, the issue does not require any factual determinations, so
there is no question of appellant having gained some advantage from bypassing the trial court.
The appellate court is not "placed at a disadvantage in reviewing the issue by the absence of
a determination on it in" the trial court. Id. at 826. Third, the appellant had "at least a
partial excuse" for not properly raising the issue in the trial court. Id. The court then
concluded, "[clonsidering the circumstances, we cannot see what there is to be gained from
refusing to decide the issue." Id.
111. Martineau, supra note I, at 1058.
112. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121.
113. This effectively removes the importance of the general rule's existence as an inflexible
rule.
114. See generally, R. PouND, supra note 5, at 374-76; Sunderland, supra note 4, at 10.
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of Civil Procedure 60(b) or a separate action." ' Martineau states that if
"appellate courts were limited by this standard, the occasions on which
[they] would consider a new issue would be sharply reduced. [The] standard
would help restore predictability to the appellate process and serve the
interests the general rule was designed to protect." '" 6
The proposed solution can be characterized as a two-step process. First,
the solution requires that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) standard
be met before a new issue will even be considered for review. This first
requirement is an inquiry into whether the attorney who failed to raise the
issue at trial did so because of "excusable neglect." 7 Second, once excusable
neglect is found, the new issue must be one that is "reflected in the
record."" 8
The first requirement is deficient because (1) it focuses too much on the
conduct of the trial attorney rather than the protection of the litigant, and
(2) the body of law which is attached to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) gives little guidance for determining the excusability of failures to
raise objections at trial. Applying a Rule 60(b) "excusable neglect" standard
requires a factual inquiry into the conduct of a litigant's attorney at trial
to determine, as the words imply, whether there was a good excuse for not
raising an issue in the trial court. This inquiry requires a comparison of
the attorney's actual conduct to some objective standard concerning how
attorneys should perform, inquiring into such matters as whether an attorney
would have reasonably known to object at trial, whether there was oppor-
115. Martineau, supra note I, at 1061. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve
a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant
not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28 U.S.C. § 1655, or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
116. Martineau, supra note 1, at 1061.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). It is correctly pointed out that not all of Rule 60(b) would
apply. Martineau, supra note 1, at 1060. Accordingly this Note will focus on "excusable
neglect" which is found in the language "mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect."
FRD. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
118. Martineau, supra note 1, at 1061.
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tunity to object, or whether the issue was in fact raised in some other
perfunctory manner." 9 Presumably, if the attorney's conduct meets the
objective standard, then the failure to raise the issue at trial would be
considered excusable, the attorney would not be at fault, and relief would
be granted on the matter. 120
This first requirement would provide a strong check on attorney conduct.
The Rule 60(b) standard rewards good lawyering by allowing only "excusable
neglect" to be overlooked in the appellate court and punishes bad lawyering
by preventing an issue from being raised where an attorney's conduct falls
below the objective standard.' 2' By focusing only on the acts of the trial
attorney, the first step in the proposed solution, much like the general rule,
does promote the concerns of judicial economy and checking attorney
negligence.
However, it is a matter of opinion as to whether the court should focus
on the attorney rather than the litigant. The litigant should be the focus of
the inquiry.'2 One judge states that the very reason for providing an
exception to the general rule is not because a trial attorney was not negligent
but because some attorneys are negligent. Expressing a concern for pro-
tecting the litigant, he states:
[T]here is evidence that . . . the quality of trial advocacy in our
nation's courts has been declining. We must strive to reverse this trend,
to be sure, but I do not think we should do so at the expense of litigants
who are not to blame for their attorneys' shortcomings. There are other,
more direct and less costly ways of raising standards of trial advocacy
than discarding [the means necessary to relieve litigants].'2
Of course, this statement could be countered with the argument that not
allowing a new issue to be heard does not leave the litigant without a
remedy; the litigant could recover his loss from the negligent attorney in a
119. Professor Martineau did not give a specific example of how the Rule 60 inquiry would
operate in the context of failures to object. However, examining the language of the rule, the
inquiries listed here appear to follow from the rule. See FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(1).
120. FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b).
121. See generally Note, Appeal and Error-New Evidence in the Appellate Court, 56 HARv.
L. Rav. 1313, 1317 (1943).
122. In responding to the statement that allowing an appellate court to remedy defects
caused by trial attorneys below encourages negligence, one commentator stated:
[I]t recalls an English lawyer's version of the sporting theory of justice that a
trial at law is a cock fight in which that party prevails whose advocate is the
gamest bird with the sharpest spurs. In such a contest a court may well refuse
to do anything for a litigant whose counsel omits to prove something not really
disputed and capable of proof by incontrovertible evidence. But in any modern
view of the purposes of legal procedure there is no need for the client to suffer
injustice in such a case.
Id. at 1318 (footnote omitted).
123. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 263, 322 A.2d 114, 119 (1974)
(Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing for the continued use of the fundamental
error doctrine as an exception to the general rule).
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malpractice suit. But this argument is faulty because if the true objective is
to remedy the litigant (not punish attorneys) the issue should be resolved
on appeal, not in another trial.
The first requirement of Professor Martineau's solution is also deficient
because the body of law which is part and parcel of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) gives little guidance to determining "excusable neglect"
with respect to failure to raise objections at trial. The law under that rule
deals primarily with cases of missing motion deadlines or having dismissals
entered against litigants rather than failures to object to error in the trial
court. 2 For example, a typical Rule 60(b) motion for excusable neglect
may involve a situation where default is entered against a party due to a
failure of the party's attorney to oppose a motion for summary judgment
within a certain time limit. 125 A Rule 60(b) inquiry would consider the
reasons for the failure, such as whether counsel was from out of town and
therefore not aware of local rules, 2 6 in order to determine if there was
excusable neglect in failing to oppose the motion. Compare, however, that
situation to a failure to raise or object to an error at trial. Applied to the
second situation, the Rule 60(b) standard would inquire into the reasons
why the attorney did not object, such as whether he was given an opportunity
to object or, given an opportunity to object, whether it was still reasonable
not to raise the issue. 27 Although the basic inquiry of whether the negligence
of the attorney was excusable is the same in both situations, each inquiry
involves different factual questions. Of course, the fact that a court would
have to perform different inquiries than what it presently considers under
Rule 60(b) does not mean there would be a serious defect in applying
excusable neglect analysis to the case of failures to object. But, if a court
is going to latch onto a different body of law to deal with a new problem,
it would be helpful if the precedent gave guidelines. Application of a Rule
60(b) standard would take on a different look in the context of failures to
124. See, e.g., In Re Salem Mortgage Co., 791 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1986) (where counsel for
creditor in bankruptcy court signed a stipulation inadvertantly, court ruled in favor of the
trustee on the stipulated issue, and counsel asked for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) for excusable
neglect); SuretyIns. Co. v. Williams, 729 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1984) (counsel for parties agreed
to settle a case for breach of contract and judgment was entered, but one party filed for Rule
60(b) relief on ground that attorney did not have authority to settle); Quality Prefabrication
v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 675 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1982) (party sought relief under Rule 60(b)
from default judgment where counsel failed to respond to a discovery motion); Supermarkets
General Corp. v. Grinnell Corp., 490 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1974) (Rule 60(b) relief denied in a
class action suit where party had notice and opportunity to opt out but had not done so);
Coady v. Aguadilla Terminal, 456 F.2d 677 (Ist Cir. 1972) (party seeking relief from judgment
entered upon failure of counsel to file a timely cost bond).
125. See, e.g., Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Administracion Central Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d
1277 (5th Cir. 1985).
126. Id. at 1280.
127. See supra notes 115 & 117.
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object as compared to the cases the rule presently deals with, leaving little
guidance as to what would be excusable.'2
Another problem with using Rule 60(b) is that once an appellate court
decides that there was excusable neglect (and the issue should be heard),
the Rule stops there and goes no further. In the situations now covered by
the Rule, it functions well. Take an example where an attorney inadvertently
enters a voluntary dismissal of both defendants rather than one and, as a
result, his client's whole case is dismissed by the court. The attorney moves
for relief under Rule 60(b) and the court determines that dismissal of the
extra defendant was excusable neglect and, therefore, the case should be
reinstated.129 As one can see, negligence on the part of the attorney is the
only inquiry. If the court finds excusable neglect, the court grants relief
and the attorney gets a chance to go back and try again. Compare, however,
the situation where an attorney fails to raise an issue at trial, which requires
an analysis with two steps rather than one: first, an inquiry as to whether
the attorney's negligence was excusable, and second, once an excuse is
found, thg appellate court must decide the issue that the attorney failed to
raise at trial.
Unlike the above case, where an inadvertent motion can be dismissed and
a new trial granted, 30 the court here cannot give the attorney a chance to
try again because the court cannot magically allow the attorney to go back
and object to the issue at trial. Once the issue is before the appellate court,
it has to be decided based on the present state of the record.
What one sees is that under Professor Martineau's solution the court runs
into the same capability problem that courts have always faced in deciding
new issues informatively.' 3' Because again, even though the appellate court
has the issue before it, the court still must question whether additional
factual determinations are necessary or new evidence is needed, or whether
the appellee might be prejudiced. 32 Thus, Rule 60(b) does not give guidance
on when an appellate court would be capable of deciding a new issue once
it is before the c9urt.
The second requirement of Professor Martineau's proposed solution at-
tempts to solve the capability problem by requiring that appellate courts
ponsider only those new issues which are "reflected in the record.' 33
However, before accepting it as a solution, one must ask what this statement
means. It cannot mean that the issue being raised for the first time on
128. Note that this is one of reasons Professor Martineau wanted Rule 60(b). See Martineau,
supra note 1, at 1060.
129. See Noland v. Flohr Metal Fabricators, 104 F.R.D. 83 (D. Alaska 1984).
130. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
131. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
133. Martineau, supra note 1, at 1061.
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appeal has previously been objected to and is in the record. If this were
true, the appellate court wotuld already be able to hear the issue without
any general rule barring it-anything raised at trial can be appealed.
Perhaps, the statement means that the facts necessary to decide the issue
are completely developed in the record. However, Professor Martineau does
not expressly define "reflected in the record" to mean that the facts are
fully developed. What one sees is that by saying the issue must be "in the
record," while supposedly solving the problem of deciding new issues on a
possibly deficient record, is as vague as saying an issue should be decided
only it is one of "plain error."'1' This lack of definition would leave
appellate courts with the same problems that they have been struggling with
under the previous case law. 35
Thus, Professor Martineau's proposed solution may actually restore some
predictability to this area of appellate procedure by requiring a specific
standard be applied to the conduct of trial attorneys before an issue is
heard. But the price his solution pays for checking attorney conduct is a
failure to provide any guide as to what an appellate court should do to
ensure its capability of informatively deciding an issue once it is before the
court.
B. A Second Proposed Solution
Another method to solve the problems of hearing new issues on appeal
is to codify a uniform model rule based on the proper application of the
principles and methods federal appellate courts have already formed. First,
the predicability problem 36 can be solved by using a uniform model rule.
By requiring each appellate court to draw from the same factors in deter-
mining when a new issue should be heard, uniform results can be expected
and lawyers, judges, and courts will be able to predict what issues will be
heard on appeal. 37 Second, the problem of lack of factual information 3 '
can also be solved. By framing the proposed uniform model rule according
to the principles and methods appellate courts have already used to determine
when to hear new issues, 39 the solution can draw on the courts' years of
experience, rather than ignoring their work, to address and solve a problem
that has actually already been solved.
134. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 48-50 & 55 and accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of how there is a lack of guidance in the case law today, see supra
notes 124-26 & 128-29.
137. An example of this methodology is Professor Martineau's own proposed statutory
solution. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
138. For a discussion of how appellate courts are limited in ability to decide issues before
them, see supra notes 49-54.
139. This involves looking primarily to how federal appellate courts have formed exceptions
to the general rule.
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Thus, to strike a balance between the competing concerns of appellate
courts wanting to get to new issues, 140 their inability to act as trial courts, 4'
and the need to prevent intentionally saving issues for appeal, 42 the following
model rule derived from the principles and methods of what has already
been done to solve these problems could be used:
A new issue should be heard on appeal only when the party raising
the issue can show:"4
(1) that there was no intentional choice to fail to raise the issue in the
trial court below;'" and(2) no further factual development of the record is necessary;'14 and
(3) opposing party will not be prejudiced by his or her inability to
present evidence or arguments on the new issue;1' 6 or
(4) that there was no opportunity to object to or to raise the issue below
in the trial court,4 7
If both (2) and (3) above are not met, but the court still deems it
necessary to hear the new issue (such as where the issue is one of great
public interest),'"4 the court should hear the issue only if the case is
remanded to ensure full factual development and to ensure the opposing
party is not prejudiced. 49
The above model rule is an attempt to allow courts to reach new issues
to prevent injustice in an individual ease. However, the rule allows a new
issue to be heard on appeal only when there is sufficient assurance that an
appellate court can correctly decide the issue without prejudice to the
appellee. Although based upon the prior case law on raising new issues, the
rule omits any language such as "plain error," "miscarriage of justice,"
or "question of law" previously used. The rule is an attempt to focus
140, See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text,
141. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
142, See supra note 23 and accompanying text,
143, Federal appellate courts have generally placed the burden on the party raising the new
issue to show why it should be heard, See City of Waco v. Bridges, 710 F,2d 220, 228 (5th
Cir. 1983) (The court held that "[tlhe burden of establishing exceptional circumstances clearly
rests on the party asserting the new issue."), cert, denied sub nom. Bridges v. McLennan
County, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984).
144. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale &
Retail Stores, 654 F,2d 1130, 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (court held that a party "should not be
entitled to raise new issues on appeal simply because those he relied upon at trial were
unsuccessful"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
145, This is based on the first principle underlying the pure law exception, see supra notes
59 & 64-66 and accompanying text, and the plain error exception, see supra notes 76-82, to
the general rule,
146. This is based on the second principle underlying the pure law exception. See supra
notes 60 & 65-66 and accompanying text.
147, This is simply a restatement of what is already required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 46 ("[I]f a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it
is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice the party,"). See also supra
notes 22 & 40,
148, See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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directly on the problems associated with raising new issues and uses the
definitive terms as stated in the cases to provide clearer guidance as to what
courts should look for. For example, using an inquiry into the factual
development of the record rather than looking for "plain error" properly
focuses the court's attention on its ability to decide a new issue rather than
on the issue's gravity.
The above model rule shows that this area of appellate procedure can be
made predictable while still accounting for the concerns that arise when a
new issue is brought before an appellate court. One need not apply a
different body of law to solve problems that body of law was not intended
to solve because all that is necessary is for one to pull together the proper
aspects of what appellate courts have been doing all along to solve the
problems.
CONCLUSION
The general rule against hearing new issues on appeal originated from
the eighteenth century English practice of a criminal action against the trial
judge. Notwithstanding the removal of the criminal action against the judge,
modern defenders advance justifications for the rule's continued existence.
These justifications, while worthy in their own right, are not well advanced
by the general rule they support because of the rule's inflexibility. The
exceptions to the general rule further put into question the rule's continued
use and give examples of circumstances under which appellate courts could
hear new issues without fear of being incapable of deciding the issues
correctly. Finally, the Supreme Court's position on the general rule is that
the rule should actually not be general at all, but rather a question of
appellate court discretion to decide under what circumstances new issues
will be heard. While the Court may certainly have given the first clear
indication for the removal of the general rule, it failed to give guidelines
within which appellate courts could exercise their newly found discretion.
This lack of guidance left the occasions on when new issues would be heard
in the state it was found-unpredictable.
Two solutions have been proposed to solve the problem of predictabilty
and to identify the circumstances under which courts would be capable to
decide issues informatively. The first solution, while substantially solving
the predictability problem, left untouched the problem of appellate courts
getting issues before them which would have either little factual development
or would greatly prejudice the opposing party if heard. This resulted from
applying foreign body of law to solve a problem which had already, in
large part, been solved by existing federal appellate court case law. The
second proposed solution solves the predictability problem by using a model
rule which would give specific guidelines for appellate courts to follow. In
addition, the model rule solves the problems of factual development and
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prejudice to the appellee by looking to, rather than ignoring, what the
federal appellate courts have already done to solve these problems
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